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The Missing Element of Environmental Cost-Benefit
Analysis: Compensation for the Loss of Regulatory
Benefits
KARL S. COPLAN*
ABSTRACT
Despite its critics, cost-benefit analysis remains a fixture of the environmental
regulation calculus. Most criticisms of cost-benefit analysis focus on the impos-
sibility of monetizing environmental and health amenities protected by regula-
tions. Less attention has been paid to the regressive wealth-transfer effects of
regulations foregone based on cost-benefit analysis. This regressive effect
occurs as long as downwind communities that suffer health and harms from
environmental contamination are generally less wealthy than the owners of pol-
lution sources that avoid regulatory-compliance costs. The availability of com-
pensation to pollution-victims has the potential to ameliorate this regressive
effect. This Article recommends that the availability of compensation to those
suffering environmental harms should be an essential part of cost-benefit analy-
sis, and the lack of compensation mechanisms should justify imposing regula-
tory burdens that might otherwise be rejected under cost-benefit analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
Cost-benefit analysis remains a fixture of environmental regulation. Its use as a
tool for evaluating proposed regulations is incorporated into several statutory
schemes, executive orders, and recent Supreme Court decisions, indicating that a
cost-benefit inquiry is a necessary element of regulatory decision making? Under
cost-benefit analysis, an environmental regulation must be justified by monetiz-
ing the compliance costs of the regulation, as well as the environmental and
health-benefit gains expected from the regulation, and then showing that the
monetized benefits exceed the monetized costs. Proponents of cost-benefit analy-
sis as a regulatory standard-setting tool argue that its use maximizes net social
welfare by avoiding allocating resources to pollution control where the value of
the pollution-control benefits falls short of the cost of implementation. Though
proponents occasionally acknowledge that cost-benefit analysis may have distri-
butional impacts, they do not condition the use of cost-benefit analysis on the
availability of redistribution mechanisms to compensate for the distributional
impacts of the failure to regulate.2
Most criticisms of cost benefit analysis as a regulatory tool have focused on the
impossibility of monetizing the environmental and health benefits of regulation.3
However, the wealth transfer implicit in cost-benefit analysis is perhaps a more
1. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(6); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
C.f. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
2. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1090 n.76
(2000).
3. Russell S. Jutlah, Economic Theory and the Environment, 12 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2021 (2001).
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fundamental criticism of its application. Simply put, that it will cost a business
enterprise $2 to prevent $1 of harm to an uncompensated member of the public
cannot ever justify failing to prevent the injury. This unfairness is most palpable
when the uncompensated injury consists of an avoidable death or illness, but is
equally salient when the uncompensated injury consists of economic costs or loss
of environmental amenities. The paradigm example of regulatory cost-benefit
standard setting, the drinking water standard for arsenic, illustrates this potential
problem of uncompensated lost benefits, as the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") accepted that a certain number of water-consumer deaths and illnesses
due to lung and bladder cancers was necessary to avoid imposing an excessive
compliance cost on public drinking water enterprises.'
This Article will suggest that a compensation principle should be a necessary
element of any cost-benefit analysis-derived regulation, and will suggest mecha-
nisms to incorporate this compensation principle through statutory amendments,
modifications of the regulatory impact executive orders, and recognition of liabil-
ity in tort law for the acknowledged, uncompensated health effects of foregoing
regulatory measures.
Part I provides a summary of the rationale for regulatory cost-benefit analysis,
including justifications based on economic efficiency, and notes that these justifi-
cations are not concerned with distributive justice. Part II reviews prior critiques
of cost-benefit analysis based on the lack of objective means of monetizing non-
market regulatory benefits and the misallocation of economic resources. Part III
proposes that the disregard for distributive impacts of regulatory choices is a third
fundamental flaw of reliance on regulatory cost-benefit analysis as its use to
forego environmental regulation can be expected to have regressive distributional
impacts and the reasons given to ignore these impacts are flawed. Part IV pro-
poses that regulatory cost-benefit analysis should take into account the availabil-
ity of compensation to those injured by unregulated externalities as a factor
mitigating against regulatory forbearance based on cost considerations. Finally,
Part V considers existing environmental cost-benefit analysis provisions in light
of the proposed compensation principle.
1. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: BACKGROUND AND
ECONOMIC RATIONALE
A. BACKGROUND
Despite decades of criticism, cost-benefit analysis retains political, academic,
and jurisprudential appeal in United States environmental regulation. The basic
premise of cost-benefit analysis is that government regulation should not be
undertaken if the costs of complying with the regulation will exceed the value of
4. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255 (2001) for a
discussion of the cost-benefit analysis applied in the arsenic case.
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the environmental benefits achieved by the regulation. Proponents of cost-benefit
analysis in regulatory decision-making appeal to common sense as well as eco-
nomic theory. The common-sense appeal of cost-benefit analysis is that, just as
no individual would pay $1000 for a lock to keep their $100 bicycle from being
stolen, regulatory agencies should be constrained from imposing million dollar
solutions to protect against minimal environmental harms. This formulation of
cost-benefit analysis appeals to regulated industries seeking to avoid expensive
regulatory requirements they believe to be unjustified.
On a more sophisticated level, cost-benefit analysis is justified on utilitarian
and wealth maximization grounds. By avoiding regulations with negative net
societal benefits, cost-benefit analysis seeks to maximize net societal wealth.
Proponents of cost-benefit analysis also argue that its mathematical precision
leads to determinate regulatory results, allowing informed judicial review of
agency standard setting, and reigning in regulatory excess.
B. RATIONALES
As noted, the political justification for cost-benefit analysis argues for limiting
regulatory excesses and rationalizing agency decision-making. Political propo-
nents of cost-benefit analysis rely heavily on academic economic justifications
based on welfare economics. These neoclassical economic arguments are based
on the premise that free market trading achieves the best overall result for maxi-
mizing societal wealth, modified to the extent that regulation is necessary to cor-
rect market failures.
In a way, cost-benefit analysis can be seen as the market-based reply to the reg-
ulatory answer to market failure: market economics fail when unregulated mar-
kets fail to capture externalities. Externalities in turn are damages to public goods
such as environmental resources. Regulation answers this failure by forcing these
uncaptured externalities onto the market in the form of restrictions on market
players' freedom of action or requirements to pay compensation for environmen-
tal harms. This is the basis of the "polluter pays" principle that underlies the bulk
of environmental jurisprudence; externalities are internalized when the polluter is
forced to pay for their harm to public goods.6 But unrestrained agencies, critics
argue, risk imposing inefficient solutions that the market would never accept. As
5. David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond Administrative Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 563-64 n.83 (1997).
6. Jonathan R. Nash, Too Much Market: Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances and the
Polluter Pays Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 465, 471-72 (2000) (discussing the role of the
"polluter pays" principle in federal environmental statutes, including the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water
Act, and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act). The "polluter
pays" principle has been incorporated as a fundamental principle of sustainable development and
environmental jurisprudence in Principle 16 of the 1992 Rio Declaration. U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992).
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one commentator colorfully puts it, "Government, in the view of many critics, is
in constant danger of drifting toward producing polka dot [business] suits-and
making people pay for them."' Cost-benefit analysis, in theory, seeks to replicate
the market restraints against agencies ignoring market values just as agency regu-
lation seeks to impose the restraints of environmental values ignored by the
marketplace.
For example, suppose an investor considers constructing a new coal-fired
power plant. Without any pollution control devices, the investment will return $1
million in profit annually. But the externalities of the plant in the form of medical
expenses for respiratory illnesses and lost workdays caused to the downwind
community would exceed $1.5 million. In an unregulated market, the investor
will build the plant, ignoring the environmental health externalities. This is an
example of market failure, as the unregulated market leads to a net social loss of
$500,000 (the investor's $1 million profit, minus the $1.5 million loss to the com-
munity). The regulatory answer to this market failure is to empower an agency
like the EPA to impose regulatory controls. But an overzealous EPA might tell
the power plant that it must install pollution controls that would achieve zero-
discharge of air pollution, at a cost of $2 million, even though a $500,000
pollution control system would largely eliminate the health risks and leave the
downwind community with environmental health harms valued at $300,000 annu-
ally. This onerous regulation prevents the investment in the power plant. With the
zero-discharge regulation, the power plant would not get built, as the cost of envi-
ronmental compliance would wipe out the investor's profits. Cost-benefit analysis
would force the agency to limit its regulation to requiring the $500,000 pollution
control system, as the cost of the zero-emissions pollution control system ($2 mil-
lion) would exceed its benefit in the form of $1.5 million of avoided health costs.
The plant gets built, and society is $200,000 richer than it would have been had
the agency been left unconstrained by cost-benefit analysis.8
The remaining problem, in this hypothetical, is that the downwind community
suffers an uncompensated $300,000 loss, while the investor's $500,000 profit
exceeds the increase in social welfare. The $300,000 of the investor's profit is not
a social welfare increase at all, but a simple uncompensated wealth transfer from
the downwind community to the investor. Thus, cost-benefit-driven limits on reg-
ulation have distributional impacts,9 and as the downwind community may often
7. Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental
Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 155-57 (2002).
8. The $500,000 profit to the investors minus the $300,000 losses suffered by the community.
9. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1720 (2001) ("The
term 'distributional effects' refers to the description of the net effects of a regulatory alternative across
the population and economy, divided up in various ways (e.g., income groups, race, sex, industrial
sector). Benefits and costs of a regulation may be distributed unevenly over time, perhaps spanning
several generations. Distributional effects may also arise through 'transfer payments' arising from a
regulatory action.").
285
286 THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAw REVIEw [Vol. 30:281
be less well off than the investors in the profitable project, even before consider-
ing the externalities of the project, this distributional impact can often be
expected to be regressive. 0
Surprisingly (at least to the non-economist) these distributional impacts are
recognized by the formal economic arguments for cost-benefit analysis, but con-
sidered irrelevant as distributive justice is not the end goal of welfare
10. A policy or effect is said to be regressive when the relative burden on a party increases as the
amount subject to the burden decreases, or, more generally, when it disproportionately affects poorer
people. See Gilbert E. Metcalf, Paying for Greenhouse Gas Reductions: What Role for Fairness, 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 393, 399-400 (2011) ("With a measure of the economic incidence (or burden)
of an environmental policy, we can state whether the policy is progressive or regressive. A policy is said
to be progressive if the ratio of the economic impact (measured in dollars) to some measure of
household well-being rises with that measure of well-being. Conversely, if the ratio falls as the measure
of well-being rises, the policy is said to be regressive."). Some economists argue that excessive
environmental regulation has regressive impacts, as the costs of complying with regulatory standards
are passed on to lower income families through increased prices and decreased wages, while the
environmental amenities protected by regulation address luxury interests valued by the wealthy. See
Diana Thomas, Regressive Effects of Regulation (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No. 12-35 2012). This
paper disregards studies establishing that environmental contamination disproportionately impacts
lower income communities and communities of color. Benjamin F. Chavis & Charles Lee, Toxic Wastes
and Race in the United States, COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST (1987). The
Thomas paper also makes a fundamental error by comparing the current low incidence of environmental
and workplace death to other causes of death in the United States, without taking into account that the
low incidence of environmental and workplace death is largely due to extensive (and successful)
regulation that has reduced these threats. Professor Thomas acknowledges this potential defect in her
analysis. Id. at n.4. Professor Thomas's conclusion that the low incidence of death due to environmental
contamination demonstrates the inefficacy of regulation is akin to arguing that the low incidence of
polio in the United States demonstrates that administering the polio vaccine is a waste of money.
Contemporary administrative examinations of the distributional impacts of environmentally protective
regulations show that low-income and minority communities disproportionately benefit from regulation
of environmental contaminants. Conversely, such communities are disproportionately disadvantaged by
regulatory forbearance. For example, the EPA made the following finding in connection with the final
effluent guidelines for coal waste disposal from steam electric power plants:
11. Impacts on Residential Electricity Prices and Low-Income and Minority Populations
EPA examined the effects of the final rule on consumers as an additional factor that might be
appropriate when considering what level of control represents BAT. If all annualized compliance
costs were passed on to residential consumers of electricity, instead of being bome by the operators
and owners of power plants (a very conservative assumption), the average monthly increase in
electricity bill for a typical household would be no more than $0.12 under the final rule.
EPA also considered the effect of the rule on minority and low-income populations. As explained
in Section XVII.J, using demographic data regarding who resides closest to steam electric power
plant discharges and who consumes the most fish from waters receiving power plant discharges,
EPA concluded that low-income and minority populations benefit to an even greater degree than
the general population from the reductions in discharges associated with the final rule.
Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source
Category, 80 Fed. Reg. 67837, 67856 (Nov. 3, 2015). See Thomas, supra note 10, at n.4. A recent study
supports the conclusion that the health impacts of lax air quality standards falls disproportionately on
low income and minority populations. Qian Di et al., Air Pollution and Mortality in the Medicare
Population, 376 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2513 (2017).
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economics." The academic economic justifications for cost-benefit analysis are
based on Pareto maximization, the Kaldor-Hicks principle, and pure utilitarian-
ism; each concept in turn is briefly (and reductively) summarized infra. 12
1. Pareto Efficiency
Pareto optimality is an ideal state of an economy, reached when all market
transactions that occur will make at least one party to the transaction better off
without making any other party worse off (net of any compensation).13 In a free
market economy with full sharing of information and zero transaction costs, the
economy should naturally tend to reach a state of Pareto-optimal equilibrium, as
any transaction that promotes Pareto efficiency will naturally occur. As long as
one party wins more by a change in distribution than the other loses, the parties
will make a bargain to accommodate the change, with compensation paid to the
losers so that the winner is better off, and the loser is no worse off
In its initial formulation, Pareto efficiency took into account free market trad-
ing in market goods, omitting the economic problem of negative externalities and
harms to public goods. Economist Ronald Coase is credited with extending
Pareto principles to such external "social costs." Under the Coase theorem,14 dis-
tribution of private rights to environmental values in a free market economy
11. Welfare economics is a branch of economics that studies welfare on an aggregate level. While
welfare economics may not necessarily have "goals," the field features two fundamental theorems: that
competitive markets produce (weakly) Pareto efficient outcomes (see also "The Invisible Hand"); and
that one can effectively achieve a particular Pareto optimal outcome by redistributing wealth and letting
the market react, which could then be supported as a competitive market equilibrium. While the second
theorem refers to redistribution, it is not necessarily speaking to redistributive justice. See PETER J.
HAMMOND, THE EFFICIENCY THEOREMS & MARKET FALURE 1, 3 (1997). Welfare economics-based
justifications for cost-benefit analysis thus do not consider distributive justice. See Ackerman &
Heinzerling, supra note 7, at 1575 (cost-benefit analysis reinforces economic inequality); see also Susan
E. Dudley & Art Fraas, The Future of Regulatory Oversight and Analysis, ISSUES OF THE DAY: 100
COMMENTARIES ON CLIMATE, ENERGY, & THE ENVIRONMENT 96 (2010); Michael Livermore, Can Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Environmental Policy Go Global?, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 146, 190-91 (2011); Don
Fullerton & Dan Karney, Does Environmental Protection Hurt Low-Income Families?, 21 INST. GOv'T
& PUB. AFF. POL'Y F. No. 2 (2009) (discussing "pathways" that environmental policy can
have regressive effects); John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics,
157 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 395, 540 (2008); see, e.g., E.J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 394 (1976) ("[I]
t is not enough that the outcome of an ideal cost-benefit analysis be positive. It must be shown, among
other things, that the resulting distributional changes are not perceptibly regressive and that no gross
inequities are perpetrated."); Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of Health
Health Analysis, 22 Eco. L.Q. 729, 763 (1995) ("In fact, studies indicate that the distribution of
environmental costs is even more regressive than the typical sales tax.").
12. This summary is based on an excellent critical treatment of the subject in Matthew D. Adler &
Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis (John M. Olin L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 72 2D
SERIES 1999).
13. Id. at 25.
14. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Simply put, "[t]he
Coase theorem states that parties will reach the identical, efficient outcome as long as
they are free to bargain without cost around the operative legal rule and there are no wealth
effects associated with the assignment of the legal entitlement." John J. Donohue III,
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(assuming full information and zero transaction costs) will naturally result in an
optimal allocation, as those who value the environmental resources will bargain
with those who might exploit it for profit to achieve a transaction, with compensa-
tion, that maximizes the net value and minimizes the losses for both sides. In the
power plant hypothetical, assuming the downwind community was given the
absolute right to prevent any upwind air pollution (but could bargain that right
away for compensation), the downwind community presumably would refuse to
allow the plant to be built without any pollution controls, because it would
demand $1.5 million in compensation (in excess of the prospective profit to the
plant developer). But, with adequate access to information about the harms to
their community and zero transaction costs, the downwind community should
arrive at an economically efficient bargain with the power company. The commu-
nity would bargain to allow the plant to be built with $500,000 of pollution con-
trol plus $300,000 in compensation for their less serious health impacts. This
transaction would be said to be Pareto efficient, because the plant developer is
better off, with a $200,000 profit, while the downwind community is no worse off
being fully compensated for their losses.
This sort of Coasian bargaining does not occur in the real-world economy.
Coasian conditions of full information and zero transaction costs simply do not
exist and cannot be created. Real-world Coasian bargains are impeded by transac-
tion costs and collective action problems," the lack of complete information, and
the lack of tradable private rights in environmental resources such as the atmos-
phere.16 In particular, collective action challenges deter Coasian bargaining
where the victims of environmental degradation are numerous and dispersed and
the environmental right is assigned ab inito to the polluter.
Collective action problems arise where a large number of people share an inter-
est." Individual members of the harmed class lack any incentive to take action
because the benefits of any action will be widely shared and diluted. Rather, each
individual will avoid taking action in the hopes that some other affected individ-
ual will take action to protect the group's interests, and the non-acting individual
will get the benefit of others' efforts without any individual effort-the so-called
free rider problem. As a result of these distorted incentives, no individual takes
Commentary, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase
Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1093, 1094 n4 (1991).
15. See generally Yvonne Rydin & Mark Pennington, Public Participation and Local Environmental
Planning: The Collective Action Problem and the Potential of Social Capital, 5 Loc. ENV'T. 153 (2000).
16. Coase posited that the initial distribution of private rights in environmental public goods would
not matter, as hypothetical free market trading would achieve an efficient distribution and
accommodation between development and environmental protection. This power plant example
demonstrates the distributional fallacy in the Coase theorem, since if the initial distribution were the
other way around (i.e., the community was required to pay the power plant developer to clean its
emissions), an unequal initial distribution of resources would make it highly unlikely that the downwind
community could afford to buy the right to clean air, which should be considered a basic human right.
17. See generally Rydin & Pennington, supra note 15.
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action, and the group's shared interests are not protected. In the case of a group of
downwind residents, no individual resident has sufficient interest to bargain, and
pay for, clean air rights. Every downwind resident shares the hope that someone
else will undertake the effort of organizing and paying the expenses of buying the
rights for them.
While initial assignment of environmental rights to the numerous and dis-
persed downwind residents might solve the collective action problem that pre-
vents Coasian bargaining, requiring the polluter to purchase the right to pollute
from numerous dispersed downwind residents poses its own transaction costs and
market failures. As Richard Posner points out in his treatise, Economic Analysis
of the Law, because multiplicity of parties leads to high transaction costs, assign-
ment of the right to the multitude of downwind victims poses insurmountable
transaction costs. Using the Coasian example of railroads and farmers whose
crops are destroyed by steam locomotive sparks, he posits excess transaction
costs where "there are too many farmers owning land adjacent to the railroad, and
if only one refused to sell, he could obtain an injunction against the railroad's run-
ning its trains on tracks adjacent to his property." 8 In addition, the lone holdout
is an example of a market failure Richard Posner describes as a bilateral
monopoly, where a landowner demands compensation beyond market value
knowing that the buyer of rights has no alternative seller.1 9
In this scenario, high transaction costs prevent real-world bargaining to achieve
the theoretically efficient adjustment of rights. But cost-benefit analysis seeks to
achieve this Coasian-bargained result through the regulatory process and is thus
justified on the basis of Pareto efficiency. The gaping defect of this defense of
cost-benefit analysis is that, unlike in the case of Coasian bargaining, no compen-
sation is actually paid to the transactional losers. In the case of regulatory cost-
benefit analysis, the construction of the power plant does make someone (the
downwind community) worse off In the case of Coase's (and Posner's) inflam-
matory locomotives, the farmer loses the value of his farmland and receives no
compensation. The Pareto defense of cost-benefit analysis responds, first, that
because government could tax the profits of the developer and redistribute those
profits to compensate the losers, cost-benefit analysis can be made to be Pareto
optimal.2 0 Second, defenders argue that cost benefit analysis can be considered
Pareto-optimal ex ante, as the net benefits of cost benefit analysis can be expected
to be distributed widely throughout society and any individual is more likely to
be a "winner" under cost benefit analysis based norms as to be a "loser," and is
18. RICHARD POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF THE LAw 51-52 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Bus. 9 th ed.
2014).
19. Id. at 62.
20. Adler & Posner, supra note 12, at 26. Of course, as Adler and Posner point out, a single
transaction in which government allows the project to proceed but taxes the profits to compensate the
transactional losers would itself be Pareto optimal, so that cost-benefit analysis would not be necessary.
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thus better off.2 1
2. Kaldor-Hicks Principle
The Kaldor-Hicks principle is a refinement of Pareto efficiency that recognizes
that, due to transaction costs and market failures, pure Pareto efficiency will pre-
vent the achievement of improvements in overall welfare.22 For example, a $1 tax
on everyone in society to pay for vaccinations that will save the lives of ten per-
cent of the population would not be considered Pareto efficient as the ninety per-
cent of taxpayers who did not need the vaccinations are each $1 worse off; but
such a tax-funded vaccination would advance maximum social welfare. 23 The
Kaldor-Hicks principle posits the utility of those transactions that maximize eco-
nomic efficiency so long as one party is sufficiently better off that that party could
compensate the party that is made worse off, even though no compensation may
actually be paid. Compensation is not paid in many such preferred transactions
because a system of compensation would be so complex as to add transaction
costs that would prevent such compensation as being beneficial and therefore
making these transactions unlikely to occur. However, according to Kaldor-
Hicks, net social welfare is maximized by such transactions even though they
have distributional impacts. Distributional impacts are thus not the concern of
welfare maximization, and, to the extent that distributional impacts are a social
concern, the increase in overall societal wealth resulting from Kaldor-Hicks is
sufficient to allow governments to impose a tax on the winners and redistribute
the income to the losers and still achieve Pareto efficiency if desired.24 The deci-
sion to make such a redistribution, or not, should be left to the policymaking
branches of government.
Cost-benefit analysis as conceived by its proponents closely tracks the Kaldor-
Hicks principle: the distributional impacts of cost-benefit analysis are simply con-
sidered irrelevant to maximizing social welfare. By definition, the existence (or
lack thereof) of compensation for the transactional losers is irrelevant. As
Professors Posner and Adler characterize this defense, distributional justice is
simply not the proper concern of regulatory agencies:
When the Environmental Protection Agency or the Food and Drug
Administration decides whether to approve a project, it might seem that it
should do so on the basis of overall well-being (however defined), and not as a
way to redistribute wealth from one segment of the population to another. If
21. As Adler and Posner point out, this defense similarly ignores the fact that "in a many-good
economy, CBA [cost-benefit analysis] will tend to favor people who have a low opportunity cost for
money and intense preferences. There is no reason to believe that the people who [are] usually injured
by projects are usually the same as the people who are usually benefited by projects." Id.
22. See Driesen, supra note 5, at 578-81 for a summary of the Kaldor Hicks justification for cost-
benefit analysis.
23. See Adler & Posner, supra note 12, at 26-27.
24. Id. at 28.
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wealth should be redistributed, independent efforts to do so by uncoordinated
agencies seem less likely to succeed than adjustment of taxes and welfare ben-
efits by Congress. The purpose of CBA [cost-benefit analysis] is to separate
out the distributional issue and isolate the efficiency issue, so that the agency
will evaluate projects solely on the basis of their efficiency.2 5
But these same commentators criticize Kaldor-Hicks as "taken as a moral prin-
ciple, indefensible." 26 Professors Posner and Adler recognize that the Kaldor-
Hicks principle tends to favor a regressive allocation to those who already have
more goods or money, and that there is no reason to believe that the overall
wealth benefits to society will cancel out the welfare losses to the economic losers
in transactions forced on them by the Kaldor-Hicks principle.
3. Pure Utilitarianism
The third, more implicit, economic justification for cost-benefit analysis is
based on a purer form of utilitarianism: the idea that society should make choices
in a way that maximizes the well-being (or satisfies the preferences) of the maxi-
mum number of people. In this theory, cost-benefit analysis is at best a highly
imperfect fit for utilitarianism, as there is no non-monetized way to compare the
improvement in well-being of the winners of cost-benefit analysis-based deci-
sions with the loss of well-being for the losers. Adler and Posner posit that such a
monetized comparison would only be valid for a utilitarian comparison of well-
being if all members of society were equally endowed financially, so that the mar-
ginal utility of $1 was equal for all members of society-a situation that does not
ever exist. 27 Alternatively, an agency might weigh different monetized values dif-
ferently for different members of society, but such an endeavor becomes so com-
plex that it lacks all utility as a guide to actual agency decision-making.2 8
In either event, the utilitarian justification ignores the distributional impacts of
the application of cost-benefit analysis to regulatory decision-making. The Pareto
justification likewise ignores these impacts, and the Kaldor-Hicks justification
simply rejects distributional impacts of cost-benefit analysis as not being the busi-
ness of economists. Yet, as seen from the Adler-Posner quote above, the precise
point of cost-benefit analysis seems to be to remove distributional considerations
from agency consideration. Underlying cost-benefit analysis is then a fundamen-
tal assumption that distributive justice is not a relevant consideration for regula-
tory agencies.
25. Id. at 22-23, 23 n.40 (citing Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions and Interpersonal Comparisons
of Utility, 49 EcoN. J. 549 (1939)).
26. Id. at 29.
27. Id. at 29-31.
28. Id.
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II. CRITIQUES OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The environmental community and environmentally sympathetic commenta-
tors have greeted cost-benefit analysis with a skepticism that matches the enthusi-
asm of industry and academic economists for cost-benefit analysis. The primary
criticism of cost-benefit analysis has been the flaw in its underlying premise:
environmental benefits of regulation for which there is no market can nonetheless
be "monetized"-that is, converted into dollar values-and thereby provide a
meaningful comparison with the more market-based dollar costs of compliance.29
Critics have also argued that cost-benefit analysis fails even to promote economic
efficiency and may cause misdirection of resources, because the assumptions
underlying the calculation of both costs and benefits of a regulation require sub-
jective policy judgments about how to assess and weigh risk.30 The subjectivity
and indeterminacy of these policy judgments vitiates the reliability of cost-benefit
analysis' theoretical claims of allocative efficiency.
A. IMPOSSIBILITY OF MONETIZING ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH BENEFITS
Professors Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling have performed a
detailed critique of the flaws of seeking to monetize environmental values for
comparison-to-compliance costs in their book Priceless: On Knowing the Price
of Everything and the Value of Nothing. They emphasize the problem that the
public goods protected by environmental regulation are by definition not subject
to markets that determine their dollar value. Any attempt to derive monetary val-
ues for such environmental amenities must, by its very nature, be artificial, sub-
jective, and value laden, and must also ignore how real people make real choices.
For example, in order to perform cost-benefit analysis, the EPA and other agen-
cies must assume a value for a human life, yet there is no market for human lives
and any sane person, when asked how much they would accept as compensation
for their premature death, would necessarily say that there is no amount of money
he or she would accept in order to die. So, an agency applying cost-benefit analy-
sis must find a value for human life based on something other than a presumed
market, either by substituting an inquiry into compensation for accepting a risk to
one's life, or by reference to tort compensation principles.31
Economists have sought to apply a number to risk of death by inquiring into
the pay differential between professions involving risk of death and those
demanding equivalent qualifications without the risk, but such inquiries are
fraught with confounding variables.3 2 Equally difficult is the assessment of nonfa-
tal illnesses and the market value of the loss of health and well-being in addition
29. See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 7, at 1556-57.
30. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis ofEntitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 387 (1981).
31. See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 7, at 1558 n.20.
32. See id. at 1558.
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to market-based treatment expenses. In one prominent case, the EPA, lacking any
direct evidence, used a public opinion survey about what people would pay to
avoid chronic bronchitis to develop a dollar value for the loss suffered by a person
with nonfatal bladder cancer.33
Even more difficult is the assessment of dollar values for environmental amen-
ities for which there is no market analogue. For example, there is no market for
protection of endangered species in the wild, nor any market analogue.
Environmental economists seek to develop an estimate of the social value of such
amenities using a technique called "contingent valuation."
Contingent valuation is developed by performing a public opinion survey and
aggregating the results to approximate the social value of an amenity.34 For exam-
ple, one survey determined that the average American household would be will-
ing to pay an average of $254 annually to prevent the extinction of the bald eagle
or about $173 annually to protect humpback whales from extinction, yielding a
social value of $25 billion for the bald eagle and $17 billion for the humpback
whale.35 Of course, such valuations are close to meaningless as a measure of mar-
ket value, both because no one is asked to pay real dollars, and because a public
opinion poll is worthless as a measure of the social value of an environmental
amenity that is part of a complex ecology providing essential environmental serv-
ices that are not measured by human economic measures.
B. MISALLOCATION OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES
Cost-benefit analysis has also been criticized by Professor David Driesen as
failing to promote its purported economic justification of achieving a more effi-
cient allocation of economic resources.36 Professor Driesen points to the mis-
match between cost-benefit analysis and economically "optimal pollution" due to
the problems of multiple regulations and attempting to match costs and benefits
in a single regulation, as well as the problem of the high transaction costs of per-
forming cost-benefit analysis with sufficient rigor to be useful.3 7 In essence, the
cost of performing a comprehensive, regime-wide cost-benefit analysis suffi-
ciently rigorous to lead to efficient choices exceeds the net benefit of those
choices, and the choices directed by piecemeal cost-benefit analysis do not reli-
ably improve economic efficiency.
33. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and
New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976 (Jan. 22, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 9, 141, and 142).
34. See W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment Through Contingent Valuation, 8 J. OF
EcoN. PERSPECTIVES 19-43 (1994).
35. John B. Loomis & Douglas S. White, Economic Benefits of Rare and Endangered Species:
Summary and Meta-Analysis, 18 ECOLOGICAL EcoNs. 197, 199 (1996).
36. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law: Cost-Benefit
Analysis, Emissions Trading, and Priority-Setting, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 501, 507-13 (2004)
[hereinafter, Driesen, Economic Dynamics]. See generally Driesen, supra note 5.
37. See Driesen, supra note 5, at 582-88.
293
THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAw REVIEw
An additional economic critique of cost-benefit analysis is that it causes the
misallocation of capital resources by artificially inflating the returns of polluting
enterprises. Taking the power-plant hypothetical in which cost-benefit analysis
compels the EPA to adopt the $500,000 pollution control measures while leaving
$300,000 of uncompensated injuries, the true return on the investment was just
$200,000, while the actual return to the investor was $500,000 (consisting in part
of the appropriation of $300,000 in uncompensated damages to the downwind
community). Suppose that the investor declined to make another investment, per-
haps in a solar power plant with no externalities, that would have a $400,000 true
social return because the power plant appeared to be more profitable.38 The effect
of applying cost-benefit analysis to avoid regulation is to distort capital invest-
ments into less socially productive investments.
C. SUBJECTIVITY OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Cost-benefit analysis' failure to achieve its own goal of determinism is also a
point of criticism. In order to determine the environmental health benefits of a
proposed regulation, the EPA must make assumptions based on limited epidemio-
logical evidence about the number of illnesses and deaths that will result from
human exposures to toxic chemicals at low doses. This requires assumptions
about the dose response curve of toxic exposures at low levels that have not and
cannot be studied in actual human populations, as well as assumptions about the
level of exposure in the population. Professor Cass Sunstein concluded that, in
the case of the EPA's arsenic rule under the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA"),
the EPA could have concluded that the dollar value of the net benefit of the regu-
latory standard was anywhere between $0 and $560 million.3 9 The underlying
choice of assumptions is a policy judgment on the part of the agency. The result-
ing range of monetized values effectively allows an agency to choose from a
wide range of regulatory standards defensible with cost-benefit analysis, thereby
defeating the purported deterministic advantage of cost-benefit analysis.
III. THE MISSING REGRESSIVE REDISTRIBUTIVE CRITIQUE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Although several commentators have noted the likely regressive distributional
impacts of cost-benefit analysis and the lack of compensation mechanisms for
38. It is true that a sophisticated cost-benefit analysis might take into account fuel substitution within
the power industry in calculating the net economy-wide "cost" of the regulation, thus obviating this
problem. For example, the "cost" of the $2 million pollution controls discussed in the power plant
hypothetical, text supra, might be counted as only an economic cost of only $600,000-the coal plant's
opportunity cost of a $1 million profit offset by the solar plant's $400,000 profit. This analysis might
then justify the imposition of zero emission pollution controls that have a health benefit of $1.5 million.
But such an analysis still does not take into account the misallocation of investments between economic
sectors-if the competing investment with a greater net social return were in agriculture, say, rather than
in power production.
39. Sunstein, supra note 4.
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these impacts, few have seized on these distributional impacts as a major argu-
ment against the use of cost-benefit analysis.4 0 But these distributional impacts
should be of prime importance to environmental policymakers. The failure to
respond to the regressive redistribution that inheres in cost-benefit analysis seems
to reflect two underlying assumptions, both of which are flawed. One is the under-
lying baseline assumption that industry has a right to pollute, so that any restric-
tion on emissions constitutes a redistribution from industry to the regulatory
beneficiaries, rather than the other way around.41 The second flaw is that distribu-
tional justice should not be the business of regulatory agencies-and, by exten-
sion, a system of environmental regulation-but should be left to the legislature.
Both of these premises are normatively flawed.
A. FLAWED LIBERTARIAN BASELINE
The first assumption is that the baseline against which cost-benefit analysis is
measured is a libertarian state in which there are no limits on a property owner's
environmentally destructive activities. This libertarian assumption negates the
underlying premise of a system of environmental regulation and its economic jus-
tification: that "there is no right to pollute."42 A system of environmental regula-
tion is premised on the idea that environmental resources are public goods and
private activities that harm these resources without compensation constitute
uncaptured externalities - a form of market failure that demands intervention in
order to correct and advance towards a more Pareto optimal state.
The libertarian resistance to environmental regulation and support for cost-
benefit limitations on regulation seem to have several roots. One essential root is
the idea that the existing hierarchies and wealth distributions are just, and that
any government-induced modification to the existing distribution of rights is
inherently unjust.43 This justification explicitly rejects a Rawlsian system of jus-
tice based on ensuring minimum standards for the least well off in society.44
Another root of this resistance to environmental regulation is libertarian skepticism
about the existence and extent of public rights, and preference for privatization of
40. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Risk Equity: A New Proposal, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 20
(2008) (discussing equity issues with cost-benefit analysis and the scholarly discussion surrounding
distributive weighting as a solution, though the paper ultimately offers another, distinct solution to the
equity concern); see also Olof Johansson-Stenman, Distributional Weights in Cost-Benefit Analysis-
Should We Forget About Them?, 81 LAND EcON. 337, passim (2005) (discussing possible regressive
effects and distributional concerns regarding cost-benefit analysis).
41. See Driesen, Economic Dynamics, supra note 36, at 589-90 (arguing that contingent valuation
improperly looks at what the consumer would pay to avoid pollution rather than what the polluter would
have to pay to buy the right to pollute from the consumer).
42. 117 CONG. REC. 38,797 (1971) (statement of Sen. Cooper in favor of the Clean Water Act).
43. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA passim (Basic Books ed. 1st ed. 1974).
44. See id.; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Rev. Ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
1999).
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public rights with adjustments made through Coasian bargaining.45 Libertarian
support for cost-benefit limits also derives from a general libertarian endorsement
of unrestricted rights to make use of real property free of regulation.
However, the real-property-rights resistance to environmental regulation is
internally inconsistent, and thus flawed. The libertarian baseline of unfettered lib-
erty to use one's real property ignores the longstanding common law principle
that all real property rights are limited by the principle that one may not use real
property in a way that harms the use and enjoyment of another's real property, a
principle embodied in the legal Latin phrase sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.46
Though this libertarian assumption of an unrestricted right to pollute is often jus-
tified based on private property rights, full recognition of the unfettered property
rights of downwind property owners might in fact negate the existence of an
unfettered "right to pollute" on the part of upwind property owners.
1. Review of Early History of Common Law Property Rights
A review of the history of common law property rights shows that this prop-
erty-based limiting principle was itself modified and weakened by judicial deci-
sions accommodating the Industrial Revolution. This accommodation, with its
failure to protect the environmental health interests of downwind and down-
stream private interests, helped give rise to a public law of environmental protec-
tion. Cost-benefit analysis proponents thus seek not a return to traditional
common law principles, but just to a restoration of the judicial accommodation of
industrial interests.
The common law of real property historically gave strong protection to the
property rights of downwind and downstream property owners. Common law
actions in trespass provided for an absolute right to prevent and recover damages
for any physical intrusion, even without showing substantial harm. Historically,
this absolute trespass remedy was limited by the common law requirement that
an invasion be physical in order to be actionable.47 This physicality requirement
45. See NOZICK, supra note 43.
46. See generally Elmer E. Smead, Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas A Basis of the State Police
Power, 21 CORNELL L. REv. 276 (1936).
47. FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR., OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS 3 (3d ed. 1996).
See generally In re MTBE Products Litigation, 379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). More
recently, courts in some jurisdictions have abandoned the visibility, or dimensionality, requirements for
physical trespass, in recognition of more contemporary scientific understandings of the nature of
physical matter. See, e.g., Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So.2d 523, 529 (Ala.1979) (allowing
liability for invasion by invisible particulates); Maryland Heights Leasing v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 706 S.
W.2d 218, 225-26 (Mo. Ct. App.1985) (intrusion by "radioactive emissions" may constitute trespass if
it interferes with plaintiffs' exclusive possessory interest in the land); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790, 793 (1959) ("It is quite possible that in an earlier day when science had not yet
peered into the molecular and atomic world of small particles, the courts could not fit an invasion
through unseen physical instrumentalities into the requirement that a trespass can result only from a
direct invasion. But in this atomic age even the uneducated know the great and awful force contained in
the atom and what it can do to a man's property if it is released."); see also Baltimore Belt R.R. Co. v.
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precluded trespass actions for smoke and invisible particles at a time when the
physical natures of these phenomena were not understood.48 However, the corre-
sponding action for private nuisance allowed for remedies for nonphysical inter-
ference which substantially and unreasonably interfered with the owner's use and
enjoyment of their property, even without a physical invasion.4 9
Thus, between strict liability without harm in trespass for visible physical inva-
sions, and liability in nuisance for invisible invasions that constituted a substan-
tial interference with the use of real property, environmental integrity rights of
downwind and downstream property owners were strictly enforced. Moreover, a
successful action in either trespass or nuisance would lead to automatic injunctive
relief-giving the downstream/downwind landowners the initial distribution of
the environmental rights when it came to any bargained-for accommodation of
interests. For example, in 1913 the New York Court of Appeals upheld an injunc-
tion requiring a $1 million paper mill to shut down in order to protect the rights of
a downstream riparian farmer."o In doing so, the court specifically rejected an in-
vitation to engage in any cost-benefit analysis, acknowledging the regressiveness
of such an analysis:
Although the damage to the plaintiff may be slight compared with the defend-
ant's expense of abating the condition, that is not a good reason for refusing
the injunction .... [Refusing the injunction] would deprive the poor litigant of
Sattler, 100 Md. 306, 59 A. 654 (1905) (allowing recovery for damage by noise, smoke, and vapors
without specifying whether plaintiffs could proceed under theory of trespass or nuisance); N. Cent. Ry.
Co. v. Oldenburg & Kelley, 122 Md. 236, 89 A. 601 (1914) (same); Merrick v. Diageo Americas
Supply, Inc., 5 F.Supp.3d 865, 880 (W.D. Ky. 2014), aff'd 805 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2015) (plaintiffs
trespass allegations re: a neighboring facility that emitted ethanol which entered plaintiff's property and
caused harm would survive motion to dismiss). These courts have substituted a substantial damage
requirement for the traditional dimensionality requirement. See id.; MTBE, 379 F.Supp. 2d at 426.
48. HARPER, supra note 47, ¶ 1.1. See generally MTBE, 379 F.Supp. 2d at 313-16. More recently,
courts in some jurisdictions have abandoned the visibility, or dimensionality, requirements for physical
trespass in recognition of more contemporary scientific understandings of the nature of physical matter.
See, e.g., Borland, 369 So.2d at 529 (allowing liability for invasion by invisible particulates);
Mallinckrodt, 706 S.W.2d at 225-26 (intrusion by "radioactive emissions" may constitute trespass if it
interferes with plaintiffs' exclusive possessory interest in the land); Martin, 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d at 793
("It is quite possible that in an earlier day when science had not yet peered into the molecular and atomic
world of small particles, the courts could not fit an invasion through unseen physical instrumentalities
into the requirement that a trespass can result only from a direct invasion. But in this atomic age even the
uneducated know the great and awful force contained in the atom and what it can do to a man's property
if it is released."); see also Sattler, 100 Md. 306, 59 A. at 654 (allowing recovery for damage by noise,
smoke, and vapors without specifying whether plaintiffs could proceed under theory of trespass or
nuisance); Northern Central R.R., 122 Md. 236, 89 A. at 601 (same); Merrick, 5 F.Supp. at 880
(plaintiffs trespass allegations re: a neighboring facility that emitted ethanol which entered plaintiff's
property and caused harm would survive motion to dismiss). These courts have substituted a substantial
damage requirement for the traditional dimensionality requirement. See id.; MTBE, 457 F.Supp. at 298.
49. See generally ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE DEFENCE OF NATURE 39-51
(Earthscan 1995).
50. Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1 (1913).
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his little property by giving it to those already rich.
Well into the twentieth century, common law courts thus eschewed the reason-
ing that law should maximize overall social welfare at the cost of distributional
justice. Respecting the traditional rights of the downwind/downstream property
owner - the "poor litigant" - resulted in an allocation of the enforceable environ-
mental right to the environmentally interested individuals downstream.
2. Common Law Property Rights and Industrialization
Recall that both Ronald Coase (on efficiency grounds) and Richard Posner (on
transaction-cost grounds) resisted allocation of the enforceable environmental
right to the downstream interest. As a result of such an allocation, impasses
resulting from high transaction costs and the bilateral monopoly problems identi-
fied by Ronald Coase and Richard Posner would tend to favor the protection of
the dispersed environmental rights, and block the economic benefits expected
from industrial activities.
The threat of these impasses eventually led to judicial and legislative accom-
modation for the industrial development, at the expense of the traditional absolute
rights of private downwind property owners. In Great Britain, in the case of rail-
road spark fire damage described by Coase, a common law court held that where
a railway was operating pursuant to expressive legislative authorization, it had no
liability for spark damage so long as it was using state-of-the-art spark controls.5 2
Thus arose the "defense of statutory authority" doctrine, which abrogated com-
mon law liability rules for defendants carrying out activities with legislative au-
thorization.5 3 In some common law jurisdictions, this defense has been extended
to protect polluting industries from liability for nuisance so long as they are oper-
ating in compliance with legislatively authorized environmental regulations.5 4
Notably, in the case of spark damage from railroad locomotives, the British
Parliament recognized the regressiveness of absolving railroads from liability for
damage caused, and, by statute adopted in 1905, ordered compensation to small
landholders for fire damage.
In another accommodation to industrialism, courts began to refuse the award
of injunctive relief for traditional trespass and nuisance. Thus, in 1940, the
United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Causby5 6 that a property
51. Id. at 5.
52. Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway Co., 3 H and N. 743 (Ex. 1858) and 5 H and N 679 (Ex. 1860)
(cited in R. Coase, supra note 14, at n. 42).
53. See generally BRUBAKER, supra note 49, at 93-112.
54. Id. 103-05. Compliance with regulatory standards has not, however, been generally accepted as a
defense to common law liability in United States jurisdictions. See infra note 76.
55. Railway Fires Act of 1905, Parl. Deb. 142 (4th ser.), cols. 348-74 (1901); Parl. Deb. 148 (4th
ser.), cols. 1478-92 (1905); see also A.W. Brian Sampson, Coarse v. Pigou Reexamined, 25 J.
L. STUD. 53, 69 n.69 (1996).
56. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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owner had no right to enjoin aircraft overflights above his land as a trespass de-
spite the common law doctrine that the owner of the surface in fee had rights
"usque ad coelum"-up to the heavens.57 The Court created an implied naviga-
tional easement out of thin air, and subsequently held that no compensation was
due to the property owner under the Fifth Amendment compensation clause de-
spite this physical invasion and loss of the right to exclude others."
More critically, common law courts eventually modified the rule that private
nuisance plaintiffs were automatically entitled to injunctive relief, and, in an
attempt to promote economic efficiency, substituted permanent damages for in-
junctive relief. Thus, the New York rule of automatic injunctive relief followed
in Whalen v. Union Paper Bag was abrogated by the New York Court of Appeals
in 1970 in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Company.59
Boomer is the leading case for the sort of cost-benefit analysis of injunctive
relief applauded by economists.6 0 Downwind property owners sued a cement
plant for the nuisance of dust emitted from the plant, and won a trial court deter-
mination that the plant's operation constituted a private nuisance.61 Nevertheless,
the trial court denied injunctive relief.62 The Court of Appeals affirmed, explicitly
rejecting both the reasoning and the result of its prior decision in Whalen that the
downwind property owner's rights demanded absolute protection through injunc-
tive relief, no matter the relative cost to industry or benefit to the plaintiff.63
Rather, the court determined that the high value of investment of the cement com-
pany in its plant, and the number of its employees constituted a public interest
that outweighed the value of the private damages to the individual plaintiffs.6 4
Boomer thus represents the rejection of common law property rights in envi-
ronmental values in the name of economic efficiency. Three points about this
abrogation of environmental policy rights are particularly salient to this discus-
sion. First, the court recognized that common law judges lacked the expertise and
tools to address industry-wide and regional environmental contamination such as
air pollution:
[I]t seems manifest that the judicial establishment is neither equipped in the
limited nature of any judgment it can pronounce nor prepared to lay down and
implement an effective policy for the elimination of air pollution. This is an
area beyond the circumference of one private lawsuit. It is a direct
57. Id. at 261.
58. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
59. 26 N.Y. 2d 219 (1970); see also BRUBAKER, supra note 49, at 119 (citing Bottom v. Ontario Leaf
Tobacco Co., Ltd, [1935] O.R. 205 at 206 (CA)).
60. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 72 (Walters Kluwer Law & Bus 9th ed.
2014).
61. Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d at 222.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 224-26.
64. Id. at 225-26.
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responsibility for government and should not thus be undertaken as an incident
to solving a dispute between property owners and a single cement plant-one
of many-in the Hudson River valley.65
Second, and relatedly, the court specifically deferred to the potential for a gov-
ernment-imposed regulatory response as an additional reason to modify common
law rights:
It seems apparent that the amelioration of air pollution will depend on techni-
cal research in great depth; on a carefully balanced consideration of the eco-
nomic impact of close regulation; and of the actual effect on public health. It is
likely to require massive public expenditure and to demand more than any
local community can accomplish and to depend on regional and interstate
controls.6 6
Finally, the abrogation of the common law right to injunctive relief in favor of
social economic welfare was explicitly and emphatically conditioned on equita-
ble compensation for the downwind property owner whose rights were being
compromised. The court conditioned the denial of an injunction on the payment
of "permanent damages" for the "equitable servitude" being placed on the plain-
tiff's land.
This history of the evolving derogation of absolute property rights refutes the
idea that the regulatory state somehow constitutes an unjust downward "redistrib-
ution" of wealth that needs to be checked by cost-benefit analysis in order to pre-
serve an existing just distribution. Rather, common law courts incrementally
abrogated absolute property-based environmental rights in favor of a rough cost-
benefit analysis. Courts thus eschewed inefficient Coasian bargaining in an
accommodation to the polluting industries, but did so specifically in deference to
an evolving regulatory state. At the same time, this judicial and legislative
accommodation sought to preserve rough economic justice by preserving the
right to compensation as property remedies were eliminated.
Several libertarian-leaning commentators have noted this traditional property-
based protection of downwind/downstream environmental interests. So-called
free market environmentalists have argued that private rights in environmental
values, as represented by expansive property rights of downwind property own-
ers, might protect environmental values more efficaciously than regulation.6 7
Some of these writers acknowledge, and lament, the judicial abrogation of com-
mon law property rights that had the effect of limiting private enforcement of
65. Id. at 223.
66. Id.
67. See generally Jonathan Adler, Taking Property Rights Seriously: The Case of Climate Change
(2009), https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=faculty
publications; see also BRUBAKER, supra note 49; Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law
Environmentalism, 94 PUBLIC CHOICE (1998).
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environmental rights.68 While this author disagrees with this libertarian assess-
ment that a robust property rights regime would better function to internalize pol-
lution harms in a market economy than a system of regulation, their insight that
unmodified downwind property rights limited the ability of upwind property
owners to cause pollution undercuts the implicit libertarian argument that envi-
ronmental regulation constitutes a form of unjust redistribution of wealth.
B. ROLE OF POLICYMAKING AGENCIES TO CONSIDER DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
This flawed libertarian premise underlies the second cost-benefit-analysis
response to the distributive justice criticism. Proponents of cost-benefit analysis
argue that distributional justice should not be the mission of regulatory agencies
whose expertise is in environmental science and policy, not economic justice.
The implicit premise of this defense is that environmental regulation is itself a
form of redistribution of wealth from relatively few upwind, industrial property
owners and investors with unfettered property rights to masses of downwind, resi-
dential property owners or renters and beneficiaries of public goods such as parks,
clean water, and clean air. Described from this libertarian perspective, environ-
mental agencies will, unless restrained, engage in a socialist appropriation of the
property of capital investors and redistribution of this property to the masses.
This perspective proceeds from the premise that regulatory agencies have no
business considering distributive justice, and that agencies must be restrained
from their redistributive tendencies. Cost-benefit analysis is meant to prevent this
appropriation, unless justified by a hypothetical Coasian bargain in which the
masses have to buy these rights from their natural owners. Allowing regulators to
consider distributive justice in applying cost-benefit analysis thus thwarts the
whole point of cost-benefit analysis, which is to prevent redistribution via envi-
ronmental regulation. In this view, such a redistributive choice should be made
by Congress, not regulatory agencies.
This anti-distributive justice argument is hogwash, of course. As noted, it is
premised on the flawed assumption that in some instances upwind property own-
ers would have an unrestricted right to foul the downstream air, wind, and soil.
An equally valid development of common law traditions would recognize the
absolute right of downstream property owners and trustees of public resources to
prevent all physical invasions of their domains. Recognizing these absolute
downstream rights would force cost-benefit analysis to ask, how much would the
industry have to pay to buy out every last downwind property owner, rather than
asking how much the downwind property owners would be able to pay the indus-
trialist not to pollute.69
68. Adler & Posner, supra note 12, at 307; BRUBAKER, supra note 49, at 127-70; see also Fred
L. Smith, Jr., The Progressive Era's Derailment of Classical-Liberal Evolution, THE FREEMAN: IDEAS
oN LIBERTY 28, 30 (June 2004).
69. See Driesen, supra note 5, at 582-83.
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The argument for cost-benefit analysis thus relies on a flawed libertarian base-
line assumption against which all limits on upstream property rights are an inap-
propriate government redistribution of value.
This argument also fundamentally misperceives the nature of the administra-
tive state. Congress grants agencies authority and discretion to establish standards
to achieve an appropriate level of environmental protection while considering
economic factors such as cost. Standards adopted by the EPA and other agencies
have the force of law because these agencies are involved in the law-making pro-
cess.7 0 To argue agencies have no business considering distributive justice is to
argue that a system of environmental law itself has no business considering dis-
tributive justice.
Such an argument refutes itself. In fact, considerations of justice are part of the
brief of every juris generative institution, regulatory agencies included.7 1 Indeed,
achieving economic justice has been part of the rationale of administrative agen-
cies from the dawn of the U.S. administrative state. The first administrative
agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"), was established to ensure
that railroad rates were "reasonable and just,"7 2 and the ICC's authority was
expanded in 1906 to include setting maximum railroad rates based on a "fair,
just, and reasonable" standard.73 The Interstate Commerce Act was adopted spe-
cifically with economic social justice in mind, to remedy the imbalance in bar-
gaining power between small-enterprise farmers and monopolistic railroads.74
Although the EPA's statutory authorizations for regulatory standard setting do
not generally make specific reference to justice or equity, the agency ultimately
came to recognize the importance of economic and social justice in carrying out
its regulatory mission. Author Mark Dowie's critical study of environmentalism,
Losing Ground, recounts this history in terms that capture the tension between a
purely technocratic view of the agency and its role in promoting social and eco-
nomic justice:
Historically, the agency has deliberately avoided issues of race and class in its
deliberations and actions. In a 1971 hearing before the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission, the EPA's first director, William Ruckleshaus, testified that his
was a technical and scientific agency that was neither mandated nor equipped
70. See Whitmany. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,487-89 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring).
71. Note that the Obama and Clinton regulatory review executive orders adds "equity" to the factors
considered along with cost-benefit analysis. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011);
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Sept. 30, 1993).
72. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 § 1, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
73. Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, 24 Stat. 584 (1906).
74. Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 YALE
L.J. 1362, 1370 ("Their aggressive, not to mention monopolistic, business practices stimulated the
Populist and Progressive political movements. The Gilded Age merged with the 'Age of Reform,'
whose early accomplishments included the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust
Act in 1890."); see also Thomas Merill, The Interstate Commerce Act, Administered Contracts, and the
Illusion of Comprehensive Regulation, 95 MARQ. L. REv. 1141, 1143-44 (2012).
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to deal with questions of disproportionate environmental impact. Over the
years, complaints of racism and injustice at EPA have mounted, many of
them internally generated. When African-American academics at Howard
University and the University of Michigan organized a conference on the mat-
ter in July, 1990, Director William Reilly attended. Shaken by what he heard,
Reilly assured the Congressional Black Caucus that he intended to establish a
work group of high EPA officials "to study risk and low income communities."
He became an outspoken advocate of environmental justice."
This awakening to environmental justice concerns at the EPA ultimately led to
the adoption of President Clinton's executive order on environmental justice,7 6
and the establishment of the EPA's Office of Environmental Justice in 1993.77
Even more recently, in 2016, the EPA issued guidance for the consideration of
environmental justice in agency rulemaking, which explicitly includes the con-
sideration of distributional impacts of regulatory choices.7 8
Professor Tseming Yang has similarly commented on EPA's delayed acknowl-
edgement of its authority and responsibility to consider equity and justice in
administering the environmental laws. His analysis concludes that economic jus-
tice and equity are appropriate concerns for environmental agencies despite the
technocratic assumptions underlying the regulatory state:
Even though the reliance on quantifiable data for decision-making has
improved environmental regulation in many respects, it has also had a subver-
sive influence. Because quantifiables tend to be impressive easy to grasp and
identify, they overpower and dominate the unquantifiable aspects of the regu-
latory decision-making process. They obscure the role of the unknown and the
uncertain, as well as the importance of those values, such as ethical and distri-
butional considerations, that cannot be measured. The overall outcome is one
that is frequently warped and suspect, but nevertheless possesses the mantle of
precision and objectivity."
Yang concludes that "[i]t would be an abdication, however, of EPA's larger
societal responsibilities as well as its specific statutory obligations under Title VI,
if it failed to proactively engage civil rights and equity issues within its regulatory
jurisdiction."s0
75. MARK DOWIE, LosING GROUND 156 (MIT 1995).
76. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
77. Notice of Establishment of the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council and Request for
Suggestions of Candidates for Membership, 58 Fed. Reg. 59,723-01 (Nov. 10, 1993).
78. TECHNICAL GUIDANCE FOR ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN REGULATORY ANALYSIS,
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-06/documents/ejtg5_6_16
v5. 1.pdf (last visited March 3, 2017).
79. Tseming Yang, The Form and Substance of Environmental Justice: The Challenge of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. REV. 143, 187-88 (2002).
80. Id. at 216; see also H. Spencer Banzhaf, Regulatory Impact Analyses of Environmental Justice
Effects, 27 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2011) (arguing for inclusion of distributional impact analysis in
all regulatory impact analyses).
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Though the EPA may have come late to the table of taking justice and equity
concerns into account in performing its regulatory functions, the principle that
justice and equity concerns are appropriate considerations for the agency is now
well established, and is consistent with the historical functions of regulatory
agencies.
IV. AMELIORATING THE POTENTIAL REGRESSIVE REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS BY INCORPORATING A COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE
A significant defect of cost-benefit analysis is thus its potentially regressive
redistributive tendency. This regressive redistributive tendency is a significant
argument against incorporation of mandatory cost-benefit analysis into regula-
tory standard setting. However, given its incorporation into several federal
statutes, executive orders, and Supreme Court jurisprudence, as well as the
strong support for cost-benefit analysis in the regulated community and its
political representatives, cost-benefit analysis will likely continue to play a
substantial role in regulatory standard setting in the United States for the fore-
seeable future. 1 If cost-benefit analysis is to be used in regulatory standard set-
ting at all, its application must take into account the redistributive impacts of
choices driven by cost-benefit analysis, and the availability of compensation to
cost-benefit analysis losers should form a part of the analysis whether to accept
the results of cost-benefit analysis.
A. CONSISTENCY OF COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE WITH UNDERLYING ECONOMIC
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
As noted earlier in this Article, cost-benefit analysis is usually justified on utili-
tarian economic grounds, either based on an artificial achievement of Pareto effi-
ciency or based on the Kaldor-Hicks principle.
The Kaldor-Hicks principle does not reject or preclude compensation, it is just
indifferent to whether compensation is paid; the principle values societal wealth
maximization over concern for distributional impacts. An underlying premise of
the Kaldor-Hicks principle is that actual compensation for transactional losers
imposes excessive transaction costs, due to the large number or inability to iden-
tify the transactional losers. Thus, society accepts these uncompensated losses for
the net greater good. By extension, cost-benefit analysis would accept these
uncompensated losses because it's part of the Kaldor-Hicks justification for cost-
benefit analysis. In many cases, the losers in a cost-benefit-analysis-established
81. The most extreme recent example of proposed legislation expanding the use of cost-benefit
analysis is the Regulatory Reform Act, H.R. 5, 1 1 5th Cong. (2017-2018), which would incorporate
formal cost-benefit analysis into all future rulemaking, as well as require cost-benefit analysis review of
existing rules.
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standard are not identifiable,8 2 but in some, they are. For example, the EPA has
set a drinking water standard for arsenic based on its calculation of the number of
bladder and lung cancers that might have been avoided with a stricter standard,
but at too great an expense. A consumer of a public drinking-water system that
just meets the revised standard and has no other risk factors, who then contracts
lung or bladder cancer should have a strong claim for compensation despite the
Kaldor-Hicks premise that compensation is too inefficient.
Neither should the Pareto efficiency argument preclude compensation,
although one must acknowledge that Ronald Coase seemed to argue against com-
pensation for externalities in the pursuit of economic utility. Somewhat incongru-
ously, Professor Coase's seminal article, "The Problem of Social Cost," argued
compensation should not be paid to victims of industrial externalities.8 3 Using the
example of steam locomotives and farmers whose crops are destroyed by sparks,
Coase reasoned that paying compensation would just encourage more landowners
to farm their land, increasing the required compensation to the point that the oth-
erwise welfare-positive railroad became unprofitable. Coase's non-compensation
argument is in direct opposition to his suggestion that allocation of the rights to
externalities makes no difference to overall efficiency-after all, compensation
to landowners for spark damage merely reflects an initial allocation of the right to
be free of spark damage to the landowners rather than the right to cause damage
to the railroad. Moreover, to reach the result that compensation would be ineffi-
cient, Coase makes the arbitrary assumptions that (1) economically productive
land was not already being farmed in the absence of compensation, and (2) the
annual additional compensation due to this newly farmed land would wipe out
the railroad's profit. But if these assumptions were both true, then it is hard to
conclude the railroad was economically efficient in the first place, because its in-
ternal profits were posited to be less than the combined externalities of (1) crops
destroyed by sparks, plus (2) otherwise productive land withheld from production
because of the risk of uncompensated spark damage to crops. With all due respect
to Professor Coase, compensation for the victims of externalities made acceptable
by the pursuit of wealth maximization should not be considered per se inefficient.
Compensation to the individually identifiable losers of cost-benefit-analysis-
established standards would serve both distributive justice as well as economic
efficiency. It serves distributive justice by mitigating the regressive wealth trans-
fer from downwind, cost-benefit analysis losers to upwind, cost-benefit analysis
82. This might be true in the case of environmental contamination linked to common cancers or
respiratory illnesses that are also linked to other ubiquitous environmental contaminants, preventing any
realistic possibility of proving causation in any individual case. In addition, compensation for harms to
widely shared public goods such as aesthetic enjoyment of recreational resources and species may be
impracticable due to the sheer number of people injured and the transaction costs of assessing and
distributing compensation. Similarly, the transaction costs may overwhelm a system of compensation
for relatively small value harms to a vast number of individuals.
83. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
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winners. It serves economic efficiency by recapturing the externalities lost by
cost-benefit analysis in the first place and fostering more socially efficient invest-
ment choices. In the power plant hypothetical, the plant investor might invest in
the solar farm if she knew that, in addition to having to install the $500,000 of
pollution control equipment, she would ultimately have to compensate the down-
wind community for its $300,000 of health impacts as well, reducing the profit on
the investment to the truer $200,000 of net increase in societal wealth.
B. TORT LAW ACCOMMODATION FOR HARMS EXTERNALIZED THROUGH COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS
Tort law could accommodate this compensation principle in a number of ways.
First, strict liability or relaxed standards for proof of causation could be applied
to tort plaintiffs with exposure to environmental hazards and the injuries that
were the subject of cost-benefit-analysis-based standard setting. Second, a form
of market-share liability for proportionate compensation based on an emitters
share of overall environmental pollution might be applied to recapture the benefit
transfer.84 Third, compliance with regulatory standards established by cost-bene-
fit analysis should never be considered a defense in a tort action to recover dam-
ages, recognizing that, in essence, standards established by cost-benefit analysis
do not constitute due care to prevent injury, but rather recognize the certainty that
a level of environmental injury will result from an activity and a determination of
whether that level of injury is acceptable to society." The first two recommenda-
tions would represent an expansion of prevailing tort concepts, while the third is
consistent with current law but has been subject to attack.
The problem of proving causation, especially where multiple causative factors
are at work, is one of the biggest barriers to effective internalization of environ-
mental health harms through common law tort recoveries. Courts struggle with
the difficulty of tracing multiple exposure pathways to multiple environmental
contaminants in applying the "more likely than not" standard of proving causa-
tion by a single source of contamination.86 Where a cost-benefit analysis has been
84. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal.3d 588 (1980).
85. See Wyeth v. Levinte, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009); Lars Noah, Reconceputalizing Federal Preemption
of Tort Claims as the Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 903, 907-24 (1996);
Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Can. v. Ives., 144 U.S. 408, 427 (1892). ALI's 1965 Restatement (Second) of
Torts stated that a government safety standard is a "minimum and does not prevent a finding that a
reasonable man would have taken additional precautions where the situation is such as to call for them."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C cmt. A (1965); the 1998 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability, comment e provides that safety regulations "generally are only minimum standards" and
"establish a floor of safety below which sellers fall only at their peril." Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods.
Liab. § 4 cmt. e.
86. See Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 329 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 2002) (need to
establish generic causation, potential for contaminant to cause injury as well as specific causation that
contaminant was cause of injury in this case)); Velsicol Chem. Co. v. Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337, 338
(Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1976) (extending joint and several liability to individual source of pollutants where
multiple independent sources of chemical pollutants combine); Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d
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performed and relied on to establish regulatory standards for an acceptable level
of public health harm, tort plaintiffs who suffer the very harms that the regulatory
agency has deemed to be acceptable should be able to rely on the cost-benefit
analysis assumptions to establish generic causation against the very industries
benefitting from the cost-benefit-analysis-based relaxation of standards. Plaintiffs
should likewise be able to rely on evidence establishing substantial exposure to
those contaminants from regulated sources to allow a jury to consider specific
causation.
The imposition of joint and several liability in cases where there are multiple
sources of a particular contaminant may pose problems of over compensation,
possibly including both regulated, unregulated, and natural sources of the con-
taminant in question. One regulated industry might ultimately be held liable for
several multiples of their share of the public health harms deemed acceptable by
the underlying cost-benefit analysis. One industrial source could conceivably be
held fully liable for the injuries attributable not just to its own emissions (and in-
herent profits) considered in the cost-benefit analysis, but for other sources' as
well under a theory of joint tort liability.8 7 This problem could be ameliorated if
common law courts were to adopt a proportionate liability approach similar to the
market-share liability approach adopted in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.
In Sindell, the Supreme Court of California adopted a proportionate liability
approach to product liability damages for a widely marketed drug, DES, where
the exact source of the product used by each plaintiff could not be determined."
Analogously, a similar proportionate liability approach might be used to appor-
tion liability for widely emitted regulated environmental contaminants. This
approach would ameliorate the joint and several liability over-compensation
problems. However, courts have been reluctant to extend the market-share liabil-
ity theory of Sindell to other contexts, including environmental exposures.8 9
1079 (N.J. 1992) (applying statistical concept of attributable risk to allow jury to find compensation in
situation where environmental exposure is not the only statistical causative factor for particular disease);
see also James Patrick Logan, What's Shakin'? Ladra v. New Dominion, LLC: A Case of Consequence
for the Hydraulic Fracturing Industry and Those Affected by Induced Seismicity, 34 PACE ENVTL. L.
REv. 207, 234 (2016) (discussing the difficulty of proving causation of anthropogenically induced
earthquakes, as well as the possibility of applying market-share liability to injection well operators).
87. See Velsicol Chem. Co., 543 S.W.2d at 338.
88. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936-38.
89. See Univ. System of N.H. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 756 F. Supp. 640,655-56 (D.N.H. 1991):
Many courts, however, have declined to apply the market share theory in drug cases, and almost
all have refused to apply it in asbestos cases. Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (DES); Bateman v. Johns-Manville, 781 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1986) (asbestos); Thompson v.
Johns-Manville, 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102, (1983) (asbestos); Dawson
v. Bristol Labs, 658 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Ky. 1987) (tetracycline); In re Related Asbestos Cases,
543 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (asbestos); Morton v. Abbott Labs, 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D.
Fla. 1982) (DES); Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., supra, 533 F. Supp. 183 (asbestos);
Hannon v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 567 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1983) (asbestos); Burke v.
Johns-Manville Corp., No. C-1-289 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 1983) (asbestos); Prelick v. Johns-
Manville, 531 F. Supp. 96 (W.D.Pa. 1982) (asbestos); Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589
307
THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAw REVIEw
Independent from problems of causation and proportionate liability, the com-
pensation problem inherent in cost-benefit-based regulatory standard setting
argues against acceptance of regulatory compliance as a defense to a common
law tort action, whether it be based in negligence or in property-based torts such
as trespass or nuisance. While environmental tort defendants have argued that
compliance with regulatory standards should constitute evidence of "due care,"
precluding a finding of negligence, most courts have not accepted such a
defense.90 Regulatory compliance may, however, be offered as evidence of due
care before the jury. Some legislative tort reform proposals include provisions to
make regulatory compliance a per se defense to tort actions.91 Because cost-
benefit-based standards are not based on preventing harm, but rather on determin-
ing whether the profit to the regulated facilities exceeds the value of harms
caused, such standards should never be the basis of a tort law defense that would
defeat compensation to the parties whose injuries were contemplated by the
regulatory standard. Both distributive justice and the cost internalization princi-
ples of environmental regulation demand compensation be allowed in such
circumstances.
C. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN LEGISLATION
For similar reasons, where cost-benefit analysis is imposed on agency standard
setting by statute, such statutes should incorporate means for recapturing the ben-
efits transfer inherent in the rejection of higher cost pollution control and transfer-
ring this benefit to identifiable environmental health victims of the avoidable
pollution. Where cost-benefit analysis is not made mandatory by statute, the lack
of such compensation mechanisms-due to the lack of a theory for legal relief or
insurmountable causation problems-should be a sufficient justification for an
agency to reject the adoption of a relaxed standard otherwise indicated by formal
cost-benefit analysis.
(D.S.C. 1981) (DES); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981) (DES) (applying both
North and South Carolina law); Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 141 Misc.2d 194, 533 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup.
Ct.1985) (DES); Goldman v. Johns-Manville, 33 Ohio St.3d 40, 514 N.E.2d 691 (1987) (asbestos);
Gaulding v. Celotex, 748 S.W.2d 627 (Tex.Ct.App. 1988); Case v. Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062
(Okla. 1987) (asbestos); Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1985) (asbestos); Zafft v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984) (DES).
90. See generally Adam D.K. Abelkop, Tort Law as an Environmental Policy Instrument, 92 OR.
L. REV. 381, 415-17 (2013); see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 320, 345 (2008) ("Most States
do not treat regulatory compliance as dispositive, but regard it as one factor to be taken into account by
the jury.").
91. See, e.g., Act of July 22, 1987, ch. 197, 1987 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 188-93 (West). The New
Jersey statute makes compliance with FDA-approved warnings presumptively adequate and limits the
availability of punitive damages when products approved by the FDA are challenged. Other states also
have enacted provisions creating a presumption that products in compliance with government standards
are reasonably safe and nondefective. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3304(a), (b) (1983); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 29-28-104 (1980); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3) (Supp. 1977); H.R. 2238, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987).
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V. CONSISTENCY OF COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE WITH EXISTING COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS PROVISIONS
Current incorporation of cost-benefit analysis into environmental regulatory
standard setting takes several forms. Cost-benefit analysis has been imposed on
regulatory agencies in some case by statute, by executive order, and by judicial
interpretation of general statutory provisions. Cost-benefit analysis is in some
cases mandatory, and in others it is precatory. A brief analysis of examples of dif-
ferent instances of environmental cost-benefit analysis, together with an assess-
ment of their consistency with the compensation principle, follows. 92
A. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Several statutes explicitly incorporate variations of cost-benefit analysis into
the parameters for regulatory standard setting. The Toxic Substances Control Act
("TSCA") directs the EPA to prepare a statement assessing the health and envi-
ronmental impacts of a substance together with the economic costs of a proposed
regulation restricting the manufacture, sale, or use of that substance. The SDWA
Act directs a more formal sort of cost-benefit analysis, directing the EPA to set
drinking water standards based on compliance costs that are justified by the bene-
fits. Several environmental statutes incorporate technology-based standards that,
more generally, direct the EPA to consider costs of compliance in relation to
environmental benefits, but without a specific direction to match dollar costs and
monetized benefits.
1. Toxic Substances Control Act
TSCA gives the EPA broad, but secondary, authority to regulate chemical sub-
stances that it determines pose a risk to public health or the environment. 93
Permissible regulations, at the EPA's discretion, range from labeling require-
ments to outright bans on the manufacture, sale, or use of such substances. By
statute, invocation of TSCA to regulate is a last resort; EPA must adopt regula-
tions under other, more specific statutory programs if feasible. TSCA directs the
EPA, in the course of rulemaking, to prepare and consider a statement assessing
the environmental and public health harms of a suspect chemical together with
the economic costs of compliance with the proposed regulation, but it does not by
its terms mandate standards based on cost-benefit analysis. TSCA § 6 (prior to its
amendment in 2016) provided:
92. An excellent overview of statutory and regulatory approaches to cost-benefit analysis appears in
Zygmunt Plater, et al., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: LAW, NATURE, AND SOCIETY 571-606
(Wolters Kluwer ed., 5th ed. 2016), and this section borrows from the analytical organization of that
casebook.
93. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (2012).
309
THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAw REVIEw
(c) Promulgation of subsection (a) rules
(1) In promulgating any rule under subsection (a) of this section with respect
to a chemical substance or mixture, the Administrator shall consider and
publish a statement with respect to-
(A) the effects of such substance or mixture on health and the magnitude of
the exposure of human beings to such substance or mixture,
(B) the effects of such substance or mixture on the environment and the mag-
nitude of the exposure of the environment to such substance or mixture,
(C) the benefits of such substance or mixture for various uses and the avail-
ability of substitutes for such uses, and
(D) the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the rule, after
consideration of the effect on the national economy, small business,
technological innovation, the environment, and public health."
By its terms, the TSCA cost-benefit-statement requirement is neither a strict
nor mandatory form of cost-benefit analysis. It does not direct the EPA to attempt
to monetize the environmental and public health harms resulting from exposure
to the chemical substance for direct comparison to the dollar costs of compliance
with the rule under consideration. Nor does it direct the EPA to reject a regulation
should the cost exceed the benefit; the EPA need only prepare and consider the
analysis. The 2016 amendments to TSCA make clear that the results of this cost-
benefit analysis should not override the requirement that chemical regulations
prevent unreasonable risks to health and the environment.95
Nevertheless, in one of the few instances in which the EPA invoked TSCA § 6
to ban a substance, the reviewing court invalidated the rule on cost-benefit
94. 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (2012); see also id. at § 2603.
95. Id. at § 2605(c)(2)(A)(iv). This section provides that when promulgating a rule under §2605(a)
the Administrator must consider .. . the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the rule,
including consideration of-
(I) the likely effect of the rule on the national economy, small business, technological innovation,
the environment, and public health;
(II) the costs and benefits of the proposed and final regulatory action and of the 1 or more primary
alternative regulatory actions considered by the Administrator; and
(III) the cost effectiveness of the proposed regulatory action and of the 1 or more primary alternative
regulatory actions considered by the Administrator. . ." The act then says, "In selecting among
prohibitions and other restrictions, the Administrator shall factor in, to the extent practicable, the
considerations under subparagraph (A) in accordance with subsection (a)." Id. at § 2605(c)(2)
(B). Amended § 2605 Subsection (a) discusses subsection (c)(2) (mentioned above) and (b)(4)
(A), which says "The Administrator shall conduct risk evaluations pursuant to this paragraph to
determine whether a chemical substance presents an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment, without consideration of costs or other non-risk factors, including an unreasonable
risk to a potentially exposed or susceptible subpopulation identified as relevant to the risk
evaluation by the Administrator, under the conditions of use." Id. at § 2605 (a). Other areas of §
2605 also say that cost won't be considered when conducting risk evaluation. Cost comes up just
during discussion of rule promulgation, which, again, says that it must comply with (a), which
states some regulation of chemicals that present an unreasonable risk.
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grounds. In Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA96 , the Fifth Circuit invalidated
EPA's rule banning asbestos-containing materials on the grounds that the num-
ber of lives saved by the rule was not justified by the cost of the rule, estimated
at a range of $7 million to $108 million dollars per life saved (depending on the
range of lives saved and the particular banned use of asbestos).97 The court
rejected the asbestos ban as arbitrary and capricious, finding the EPA's accep-
tance of such a high cost per life saved to demonstrate that EPA had been "cav-
alier" in its implementation of the cost-benefit statement requirement of
TSCA. 98
It may be difficult to evaluate TSCA's cost-benefit statement in the rubric of
the proposed compensation principle, because TSCA by its terms grants broad
discretion to the EPA on whether to invoke its regulatory provisions, and the
cost-benefit provisions of TSCA are precatory, not (by their terms) mandatory.
Certainly, the lack of realistic compensation mechanisms for victims of exposure
to a given chemical should be a valid reason for the EPA to accept apparently dis-
proportionate costs to industry for compliance with a proposed regulation. Lack
of realistic compensation mechanisms might be due to the challenges of proving
exposure and causation in the case of chemicals in wide use and associated ill-
nesses (like cancers) with multiple potential triggers. In the case of the asbestos
ban, compensation may have been unavailable due to bankruptcies in the asbestos
industry. 99
2. The Safe Drinking Water Act
The Safe Drinking Water Act directs the EPA to set maximum contamina-
tion limits for potentially harmful contaminants in public drinking water sup-
plies."oo In setting these limits, the EPA is required to perform a formal,
monetized cost-benefit analysis, and is authorized to adopt a less stringent
standard than the one achieved by the most advanced technology on the basis
that it "maximizes health risk reductions at a cost that is justified by the bene-
fits."o The SDWA thus incorporates a formal cost-benefit analysis into
regulatory standard setting. To accomplish this, it sets forth a relatively sophis-
ticated set of guidelines for monetizing the public-health-benefit-side of the
cost-benefit analysis equation:
96. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1223.
99. See MARK D. PLEVIN & PAUL W. KALISH, WHERE ARE THEY Now? A HISTORY OF THE
COMPANIES THAT HAVE SOUGHT BANKRUPTCY PROTECTION DUE TO ASBESTOS CLAIMS, ASBESTOS
BANKRUPTCY REPORT (LexisNexis 2001), https://www.crowell.com/documents/DOCASSOCFKTYPE_
ARTICLES_424.pdf.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 300f(1) (2012).
101. Id. at § 300g-1(b)(6).
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(i) Maximum contaminant levels.
When proposing any national primary drinking water regulation that includes
a maximum contaminant level, the Administrator shall . . . use . . . an analysis
of each of the following:
(I) Quantifiable and nonquantifiable health risk reduction benefits ...
(II) Quantifiable and nonquantifiable health risk reduction benefits ... from
reductions in co-occurring contaminants ...
(III) Quantifiable and nonquantifiable costs . . . likely to occur solely as a
result of compliance with the maximum contaminant level, including
monitoring, treatment, and other costs ...
(IV) The incremental costs and benefits associated with each alternative
maximum contaminant level considered.
(V) The effects of the contaminant on the general population and on groups
within the general population . . . that are identified as likely to be at
greater risk of adverse health effects due to exposure to contaminants in
drinking water than the general population.
(VI) Any increased health risk that may occur as the result of compliance,
including risks associated with co-occurring contaminants.
(VII) Other relevant factors, including the quality and extent of the informa-
tion, the uncertainties in the analysis . . .1
The rulemaking that established a ten-micrograms-per-liter arsenic standard
for drinking water provides an example of agency implementation of formal cost-
benefit analysis. The EPA rejected a five-microgram standard that would have
resulted in the avoidance of 51-100 lung and bladder cancers, for a monetized
benefit of between $190 and $360 million, and a cost to the water industry of
between $420 and $470 million. 103 It adopted the ten-micrograms standard based
on a calculation that the standard would avoid 37 to 56 cancers, with a monetized
value of between $140 and $200 million, at a compliance cost of between $180
and $210 million.104
Application of a compensation principle to the arsenic standard setting might
have justified an EPA decision to adopt the stricter standard based on technologi-
cal feasibility, rather than the more relaxed standard based on a rough balance
between cost and benefit. This is because causation issues may, as a practical mat-
ter, preclude compensation to the losers of a cost-benefit analysis based standard.
By the EPA's estimates, as many as 50 people will contract bladder and lung can-
cer because the EPA rejected the stricter five-micrograms standard, and these
people would be unlikely to be able to prove causation in a personal injury
102. Id. at 300g-1(b)(3)(C)(i).
103. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, supra note 33, at 7009, 7017.
104. Id.
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lawsuit against their water supplier. Application of a cost-benefit analysis com-
pensation-principle in the context of a tort claim would argue for judicial recogni-
tion of a rule relaxing proof of causation where a plaintiff can show exposure to a
contaminant that would have been regulated more strictly but for the application
of cost-benefit analysis, which might be the case for a long-term consumer of
water from a system that just meets the relaxed arsenic standard.
On the other hand, the SDWA cost-benefit analysis provision might provide an
(possibly inadvertent) example of cost-benefit analysis that does not result in a re-
gressive wealth redistribution. This is because public water suppliers in the
United States are regulated public utilities, whose profits are regulated and whose
rates are set based on a reasonable return on investment. The costs saved by a util-
ity that is not required to install costly treatment systems are (at least in theory)
required to be passed to the consumers, who are placed at risk by the environmen-
tal contamination, which generally offsets the regressive redistribution implicit in
cost-benefit analysis."o' Of course, this offset is only true ex ante-once a particu-
lar unlucky water consumer is afflicted with one of the cancers that could have
been avoided, that consumer has not been fully compensated, while other con-
sumers have.106
3. Statutory Technology-Based Standards
Several regulatory schemes require the EPA to set standards based on available
control technologies. The Clean Water Act ("CWA"),10 7 Clean Air Act
("CAA"),"os and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")1 09 all
require such technology-based standards. In determining whether a control tech-
nology is available for implementation, the EPA is typically instructed to con-
sider compliance cost. Typical among these provisions is § 304 of the CWA,
which defines "best practicable technology" as follows: "Factors relating to the
assessment of best practicable control technology currently available . . . shall
include consideration of the total cost of application of technology in relation to
105. The arsenic standard rulemaking record acknowledged this potential pass-through: "EPA is also
aware that a number of small systems have already installed these technologies and found them to be
affordable. Because these technologies are affordable by small systems, economies of scale would also
make them affordable to large size systems. The increased cost is expected to be passed on to the
consumer either as a water rate increase or as a tax increase." 50 Fed. Reg. 46914 (Nov. 13, 1985).
106. Risk can, in theory, be spread through economic instruments such as insurance, but there is no
reason to think that an individual exposed to a small but significant risk is likely to purchase extra
insurance for that risk, or that such extra insurance will provide compensation for injuries beyond the
direct medical costs of treatment or mortality. Professor Driesen notes this paradox in the problem of
monetizing risk versus monetizing actual injury and suggests that it skews cost-benefit analysis to
undervalue the harms caused by deregulation. See Driesen, supra note 5, at 587-88.
107. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (2012).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o) (2012).
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the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such application." 1 0
Although this section might be literally read to require a strict cost-benefit
analysis, with monetization of costs and benefits and establishment of the ulti-
mate standard based on a direct comparison, the legislative history of this sec-
tion makes clear that a technology should be rejected as best practicable
technology only where the costs are "wholly of out proportion" to the bene-
fits, 11 and the courts have so interpreted this provision in upholding EPA
standards that impose compliance costs exceeding the direct monetized bene-
fits of the standard.1 12
Because these technology-based standards do not typically impose strict, for-
mal cost-benefit analysis or decision-making, these standards arguably have a
less regressive redistributive effect than strict cost benefit-analysis requirements
and are less susceptible to a critique based on failure to provide for compensation
to the loss of regulatory benefits to the public.
B. EXECUTIVE ORDERS
By executive order, starting with President Reagan, presidents have directed
agencies to consider compliance costs in comparison to benefits in all rulemak-
ing, except where precluded by statute.
President Reagan first incorporated cost-benefit analysis into all agency rule-
making in Executive Order 12,291. This order directs:
Sec.2. General Requirements. In promulgating new regulations, reviewing
existing regulations, and developing legislative proposals concerning regula-
tion, all agencies, to the extent permitted by law, shall adhere to the following
requirements:
(a) Administrative decisions shall be based on adequate information concern-
ing the need for and consequences of proposed government action;
(b) Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to
society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society;
110. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (2012).
111. Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 204 n.80 (1989) (citing U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 170 (1973)).
112. See id. ("See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Assoc., 449 U.S. at 71 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. at 300 n.
10; American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d at 119. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted this
legislative history to prohibit EPA from relying upon a cost-benefit comparison to select a lower level of
technology than BPT unless increased costs would be wholly disproportionate to potential effluent
reduction benefits. Association of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d at 805."); see also Rybachek v.
EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1289 (9th Cir. 1990) ("From this statutory language, it is 'plain that, as a general
rule, the EPA is required to consider the costs and benefits of a proposed technology in its inquiry to
determine the BPT.' Ass'n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 805 (9th Cir. 1980). The EPA has
broad discretion in weighing these competing factors. Id. It may determine that a technology is not BPT
on the basis of this cost-benefit analysis only when the costs are "wholly disproportionate" to the
potential effluent-reduction benefits.").
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(c) Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to
society;
(d) Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the alter-
native involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen; and
(e) Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing the ag-
gregate net benefits to society, taking into account the condition of the par-
ticular industries affected by regulations, the condition of the national
economy, and other regulatory actions contemplated for the future.1 13
Although Executive Order 12,291 purports to apply only "to the extent permit-
ted by law," it establishes elaborate procedures which allow the Office of
Management and Budget to block the promulgation of regulations seen to conflict
with its goals. As a practical matter, then, Executive Order 12,291 had the effect
of overlaying a gloss of cost-benefit analysis on all agency rulemaking, whether
the underlying statutory standard contemplated cost-benefit analysis or not.
President Bill Clinton expanded upon the procedures implemented by
Executive Order 12,291 and refined the direction to conduct regulatory cost-
benefit analysis in Executive Order 12,866, issued September 30, 1993. This
refinement of cost-benefit analysis responded to some of the criticisms of cost-
benefit analysis, including the difficulty in monetizing environmental benefits
and the distributive justice difficulties of cost-benefit analysis. Executive Order
12,866 provides:
Section 1. Statement of Regulatory Philosophy and Principles.
(a) The Regulatory Philosophy. Federal agencies should promulgate only such
regulations as are required by law, are necessary to interpret the law, or are
made necessary by compelling public need, such as material failures of private
markets to protect or improve the health and safety of the public, the environ-
ment, or the well-being of the American people. In deciding whether and how
to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory
alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating. Costs and benefits shall
be understood to include both quantifiable measures (to the fullest extent that
these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative measures of costs and benefits
that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider. Further, in
choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select
those approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages; distributive
impacts; and equity), unless a statute requires another regulatory approach.1 1 4
Notably, Executive Order 12,866 directs agencies to consider non-quantifiable,
qualitative benefits of regulations, as well as "distributive impacts" in establish-
ing regulatory standards.
113. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
114. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Sept. 30, 1993).
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Similarly, President Obama refined the parameters of cost-benefit analysis in
regulatory impact review in Executive Order 13,563, issued January 18, 2011.
Executive Order 13,563 provides:
(b) This order is supplemental to and reaffirms the principles, structures, and
definitions governing contemporary regulatory review that were established in
Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 1993. As stated in that Executive
Order and to the extent permitted by law, each agency must, among other
things: (1) propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination
that its benefits justify its costs (recognizing that some benefits and costs are
difficult to quantify); (2) tailor its regulations to impose the least burden on so-
ciety, consistent with obtaining regulatory objectives, taking into account,
among other things, and to the extent practicable, the costs of cumulative regu-
lations; (3) select, in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, those
approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environ-
mental, public health and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts;
and equity).1 15
The Obama Executive Order adds "equity" to the consideration of distributive
impacts in agency implementation of cost-benefit analysis.
President Trump has issued two executive orders bearing on the consideration
of costs and benefits in regulatory actions. First, Executive Order 13,77,116
issued January 30, 2017, requires that for every new regulation issued for public
notice and comment by an agency, that agency must propose the elimination of
two existing regulations that would result in compliance cost savings at least
equal to the compliance costs expected from the new regulation. Second,
Executive Order 13,77,117 issued February 24, 2017, references Executive
Orders 12,866 and 13,563 (the Clinton and Obama cost-benefit executive orders)
and directs each agency to create a regulatory reform task force to identify regula-
tions for elimination specifically including "regulations that . .. (iii) impose costs
that exceed benefits." 1 8 These Trump executive orders do not fit into the pre-
existing parameters of cost-benefit analysis. Executive Order 13,771 seems to
mandate the elimination of regulations solely on the basis of compliance costs,
without any reference at all to the benefits associated with the regulation.
Literally read, this executive order contradicts all of the economic social welfare
arguments in favor of cost-benefit analysis. That is, by requiring the elimination
of a regulation that, hypothetically, imposes $100 million dollars of compliance
costs but has $1 billion of easily monetized social benefits, the executive order
decreases societal wealth rather than increases it. Executive Order 13,771 refer-
ences the previous executive orders incorporating non-monetizable benefits and
115. 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
116. Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Feb. 3, 2017).
117. Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Feb. 24, 2017).
118. Id.
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distributional impacts into regulatory review, but then directs agencies to target
regulations based on a straight cost-benefit comparison, without considering non-
quantifiable benefits or distributional impacts.
The inclusion of "distributive impacts" and "equity" in the parameters of cost-
benefit analysis under the Clinton and Obama executive orders is broad enough
to include consideration of the availability of compensation to cost-benefit analy-
sis losers. But there is no record of any agency including consideration of the
availability of compensation to the public health and welfare victims of foregone
regulation.119 Achievement of justice and equity would demand that such consid-
eration be made an explicit, and essential, part of cost-benefit analysis performed
under executive order regulatory review.
C. JUDICIALLY IMPOSED COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
In recent years, culminating in the case of Michigan v. EPA, 120 the Supreme
Court has moved toward incorporating some form of cost-benefit analysis into its
interpretation of open-ended statutory standards for rulemaking. 121 This repre-
sents an evolution in the Court's jurisprudence, which has migrated from fore-
closing consideration of cost in the implementation of health-based statutory
standards in Whitman v. American Trucking Association,122 to the permission of
consideration of cost of compliance in a more open-ended statutory standard in
Entergy v. Riverkeeper,12 3 to its most recent decision in Michigan requiring EPA
consideration of costs of compliance in applying an open-ended standard.
In Whitman, industry trade groups challenged the EPA's establishment of
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") for particulate matter
and ozone. The CAA directs that such standards be set "based on such criteria
and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public
119. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 54
(2015) (recommending regulatory reforms including "clear presentation of quantified and non-
quantified costs, benefits, and distributional effects of proposed regulations and their alternatives."). The
Report also says that "[s]o far as we are aware, there is only limited analysis of the distributional effects
of regulation." Id. at 10. It goes on to cite two scholarly articles and does not offer any examples of
actual regulation that may have taken place and how agencies may have reacted to distributional effects.
See also Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences
Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1124 (2000) (discussing executive orders instructing agencies to
look at distributive impacts and equity: "one might doubt whether these instructions have had much
impact. On the one hand, agencies typically publish, alongside the CBA, a discussion of distributive
impacts. On the other hand, these discussions are usually formulaic and inconclusive. But they do show
that distributive issues have some prominence, contrary to the prescription of textbook CBA.").
120. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
121. Id.
122. 531 U.S. 457,468(2001).
123. 556 U.S. 208 (2009).
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health."124 Industry challenged the EPA's refusal to consider the cost of compli-
ance in establishing this health-based standard. The Supreme Court ultimately
rejected this challenge based on the clear statutory direction to base the NAAQS
standard solely on health considerations:
Were it not for the hundreds of pages of briefing respondents have submitted
on the issue, one would have thought it fairly clear that the test does not permit
the EPA to consider costs in setting the standards ...
To prevail ... respondents must show a textual commitment of authority to the
EPA to consider costs in setting NAAQSs under sec. 109(b)(1). And because
sec. 109(b)(1) and the NAAQSs for which it provides are the engine that drives
nearly all of title I of the CAA, that textual commitment must be a clear one.
Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory
scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions - it does not, one might say,
hide elephants in mouseholes.125
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have been more receptive to importing
consideration of compliance costs into more open-ended statutory standards for
rulemaking. In Entergy v. Riverkeeper, environmental groups challenged the
EPA's refusal to require a particular proven (but expensive) technology-closed
cycle cooling-for power plant cooling systems. The CWA requires that such
systems reflect the "best technology available" to minimize adverse environmen-
tal impacts. 1 26 The EPA considered the cost of this closed-cycle technology in
rejecting a requirement that it be adopted by the entire industry. The Second
Circuit held that the EPA could not consider cost in determining the "best" tech-
nology. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an undefined statutory term as
broad as "best technology available" was susceptible to an interpretation that
costs be considered. 127
In Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court completed its migration towards full
incorporation of cost-benefit analysis into agency decision-making, at least where
cost-benefit analysis is not facially precluded by the statutory terms. Michigan
dealt with a CAA provision authorizing the EPA to establish technology-based
limits for hazardous air pollutants emitted by fossil fuel fired power plants should
it deem such regulation "appropriate and necessary." 128 Because the CAA
required consideration of compliance costs at a later stage of the regulatory pro-
cess (once the actual standards are set), the EPA based its determination to regu-
late such power plants solely on the magnitude of the environmental and public
health impacts of emissions from power plants, without reference to the costs of
124. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012).
125. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 465, 468.
126. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012).
127. Entergy, 556 U.S. at 218-23.
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012).
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compliance. 12 9 The Supreme Court interpreted the term "appropriate" to mandate
consideration of compliance costs and remanded the hazardous air pollutants reg-
ulations for reconsideration incorporating a cost-benefit analysis. According to
the Court:
There are undoubtedly settings in which the phrase "appropriate and necessary"
does not encompass cost. But this is not one of them. Section 7412(n)(1)(A)
directs EPA to determine whether "regulation is appropriate and necessary."
(emphasis added.) Agencies have long treated cost as a centrally relevant factor
when deciding whether to regulate. Consideration of cost reflects the under-
standing that reasonable regulation ordinarily requires paying attention to the
advantages and the disadvantages of agency decisions ...
Our reasoning so far establishes that it was unreasonable for EPA to read
§ 7412(n)(1)(A) to mean that cost is irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate
power plants. The Agency must consider cost-including, most importantly,
cost of compliance-before deciding whether regulation is appropriate and
necessary. We need not and do not hold that the law unambiguously required
the Agency, when making this preliminary estimate, to conduct a formal cost-
benefit analysis in which each advantage and disadvantage is assigned a mone-
tary value.130
Although this reasoning rejects the grafting of formal cost-benefit analysis
onto open-ended statutory regulatory authority, earlier in the opinion the Court
recites with some skepticism that, based on the EPA's regulatory impact review,
"[t]he costs to power plants were thus between 1,600 and 2,400 times as great as
the quantifiable benefits from reduced emissions of hazardous air pollutants."131
Michigan represents the Court's acceptance of some form of cost-benefit analysis
as normal agency practice-the rule rather than the exception.
Although Michigan stops short of mandating agency results consistent with
cost-benefit analysis, Corrosion Proof Fittings demonstrates the perils of agency
regulation that imposes apparently disproportionate costs to the quantifiable envi-
ronmental benefits. A reviewing court may view regulations that impose such
costs as per se arbitrary.
Recognition (as argued in this Article) that cost-benefit analysis itself repre-
sents a regressively redistributive limit on agency standard setting should temper
any judicial presumption of irrationality of imposing costs greater than quantifi-
able benefits. The economic efficiency inherent in the countervailing polluter-
pays principle, together with the lack of mitigating mechanisms for compensation
for the public, means downstream "losers" in strict cost-benefit analysis standard
setting should argue for great latitude in agency departure from the results of
129. In fact, the EPA also performed cost-benefit analysis as required by Executive Order 12,992, but
the Court did not consider that sufficient under the statute.
130. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707,2711 (2015).
131. Id. at 2706.
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cost-benefit analysis. It bears noting that in Whitman, a group of prominent econ-
omists filed a brief urging rejection of the EPA's refusal to consider costs in set-
ting the NAAQS. In their brief however, these economists were careful to avoid
the argument that the results of cost-benefit analysis should bind agency decision
making rather than simply inform it:
Agencies should not be bound by a strict cost-benefit test, but should be
required to consider available cost-benefit analyses. There may be factors
other than economic benefits and costs that agencies will want to weigh in
decisions, such as equity within and across generations.132
Equity includes avoiding regressive redistribution of wealth. Cost-benefit anal-
ysis is by its very nature regressively redistributive, because it converts public
goods such as clean air and water, as well as dispersed private goods such as
good health enjoyed by the less well off in society, into reduced costs and profits
for investors in industrial and business enterprises. Equity demands that these re-
gressive effects be resisted, except where adequate provision for compensation to
the victims exists. Accordingly, judicial review of agency decision-making fol-
lowing cost-benefit analysis procedures imposed by statute, executive order, or
judicial interpretation should recognize the lack of compensation to victims as a
reason for rejecting the guidance of cost-benefit analysis.
CONCLUSION
A significant, but under-acknowledged, objection to the use of cost-benefit
analysis in environmental standard setting is the regressive benefits transfer inher-
ent in cost-benefit analysis. Whenever stricter environmental controls are rejected
because their cost to the polluter exceeds the benefit to communities downstream,
the community's losses are being transferred as cost savings to the polluter, usu-
ally without compensation. Continued use of cost-benefit analysis must take this
benefits-transfer into account by creating mechanisms for compensation to the
downstream community or by rejecting application of cost-benefit analysis when
no compensation can be made available. Tort principles can also recognize and
ameliorate the inequitable redistribution inherent in cost-benefit analysis by
relaxing strict causation requirements in the case of injuries acknowledged during
cost-benefit analysis standard setting, and by rejecting any liability defense based
on compliance with a cost-benefit analysis-established regulatory standard.
132. Brief for AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Cross-Petitioners at 10, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2000) (No. 99-1426), 2000
WL 1015407 at *10.
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